Brief Facts:

Mr. Wall was found by his church to have violated their teachings and was disfellowshipped for not being sufficiently repentant. His loss of membership meant his former co-congregants would no longer do business with him as a real estate agent. His business suffered to the point of bankruptcy.  He took his church to court and asked that the church’s decision be overturned because it was not properly made – in legal jargon, that is called “procedural fairness.” Immediately, the church took the position that courts have no right to interfere with membership decisions and religious beliefs. The Supreme Court agreed.

Decision:

Justice Malcolm Rowe wrote the decision in clear and unambiguous language: these types of cases are of no concern of the court. Judicial review is limited to public decision makers, which the church is not. The church was not operating as a public authority. He also pointed out that procedural fairness can only apply if there is a legal right at issue, such as a contract. Finally, Rowe made it clear that when it comes to church issues – whether procedural or theological – that is not the bailiwick of a civil court.

Key Quotes:

“Judicial review is only available where there is an exercise of state authority and where that exercise is of a sufficiently public character.” (Para. 14)

“Thus, by its nature, a private Act is not a law of general application and its effect can be quite limited…. For instance, The United Church of Canada Act … gives effect to an agreement regarding the transfer of property rights (from the Methodist, Congregationalist and certain Presbyterian churches) upon the creation of the United Church of Canada; it is not a grant of statutory authority.” (Para. 18)

“In my view, a decision will be considered to be public where it involves questions about the rule of law and the limits of an administrative decision maker’s exercise of power. Simply because a decision impacts a broad segment of the public does not mean that it is public in the administrative law sense of the term. Again, judicial review is about the legality of state decision making.” (Para. 20)

“Thus it does not follow that ‘public’ decisions of a private body — in the sense that they have some broad import — will be reviewable. The relevant inquiry is whether the legality of state decision making is at issue.  The present case raises no issues about the rule of law. The Congregation has no constating private Act and the Congregation in no way is exercising state authority.”  (Paras. 21-22)

“Indeed, there is no free standing right to procedural fairness with respect to decisions taken by voluntary associations. Jurisdiction cannot be established on the sole basis that there is an alleged breach of natural justice or that the complainant has exhausted the organization’s internal processes. Jurisdiction depends on the presence of a legal right which a party seeks to have vindicated. Only where this is so can the courts consider an association’s adherence to its own procedures and (in certain circumstances) the fairness of those procedures.” (Para. 24)

“Mr. Wall had no property right in maintaining his client base. As Justice Wakeling held in dissent in the court below, Mr. Wall does not have a right to the business of the members of the Congregation.” (Para. 30)

Credit: Barry W. Bussey

“In addition to questions of jurisdiction, justiciability limits the extent to which courts may engage with decisions by voluntary associations even when the intervention is sought only on the basis of procedural fairness. Justiciability relates to the subject matter of a dispute. The general question is this: Is the issue one that is appropriate for a court to decide?” (Para. 32)

“There is no single set of rules delineating the scope of justiciability. Indeed, justiciability depends to some degree on context, and the proper approach to determining justiciability must be flexible. The court should ask whether it has the institutional capacity and legitimacy to adjudicate the matter.” (Para. 34)

“By way of example, the courts may not have the legitimacy to assist in resolving a dispute about the greatest hockey player of all time, about a bridge player who is left out of his regular weekly game night, or about a cousin who thinks she should have been invited to a wedding.” (Para. 35)

“As this Court held … the Charter does not apply to private litigation. Section 32 specifies that the Charter applies to the legislative, executive and administrative branches of government…. The Charter does not directly apply to this dispute as no state action is being challenged, although the Charter may inform the development of the common law…. In the end, religious groups are free to determine their own membership and rules; courts will not intervene in such matters save where it is necessary to resolve an underlying legal dispute.” (Para. 39)

David Gnam, counsel for Jehovah’s Witnesses Barry W. Bussey, counsel for CCCC

Commentary

This decision has laid to rest the idea that just because a religious body is incorporated through a “Private Act” of a provincial or federal legislature it thereby has statutory authority to act as if it were government. Justice Rowe was very clear. Such Acts are limited, and they have not passed on to the entity legislative authority. This is a crucial finding as there have been many cases over the years that have made the suggestion that incorporation through a private act confers state authority. Now we know that such reasoning is not valid law. A church is not a state actor.

Because a church is not a state actor, its decisions cannot be presumed to be reviewable by the courts. A court, as Rowe made clear, can only review a public body or intervene where there is a legal right between the disputing parties, such as a contractual right. No such right existed here. The church was not a state actor and there was no other legal right between the parties that the courts should be concerned about.

Another interesting distinction that Justice Rowe made was on the issue of what is “public.” Under administrative law, “public” refers to the government and its actions; in a generic sense, “public” may also be used to mean a broad segment of the population. This is an important issue for religious communities because there is a view that anytime a religious community gets involved in the “public,” such as running schools or universities, then it must be considered as a public actor subject to the Charter. Of course, such entities do have to follow government regulations if they are licensed by the government, but to suggest that they are, in fact, government actors is taking it a step too far.

This has relevance for the Trinity Western University Case. Will the Court say that TWU is a “state actor” because it runs a university? Will it conclude that while TWU is not “directly” subject to the Charter it might be “indirectly” because of the Law Societies’ regulation of law schools? We wait with great anticipation for the TWU decision which could come as early as next week.

Finally, the court has made it clear that when it comes to voluntary organizations such as churches, there is no automatic entitlement to go to court and argue that the organization’s decisions were unfair. For a court to review a decision of an organization there must be an underlying legal right that supports that claim, such as a contract. Where no such right exists, a voluntary organization is free to make decision as it sees fit, without having to worry about a judicial review from the civil courts. This gives voluntary organizations a lot of breathing space.

Justice Rowe used the phrase “institutional capacity and legitimacy” for good reason. Courts are not equipped or qualified to settle internal religious disputes. Nor do they have the time.

As Rowe said, “In the end, religious groups are free to determine their own membership and rules; courts will not intervene in such matters save where it is necessary to resolve an underlying legal dispute.”

This is a great decision for the religious and voluntary community in Canada.

Read the decision here: Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Randy Wall

CCCC Factum in the Wall case.

Intersection Moments video of January 2018 discussing the case

The post Bussey’s Commentary on Wall Decision Recognizing The Freedom of Religious Communities To Make Decisions on Membership & Internal Rules appeared first on CCCC Blogs.

The post Supreme Court of Canada: Churches Free to Determine Membership Requirements and Disciplinary Process Without Judicial Review appeared first on CCCC Blogs.

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On November 2, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to do something Canadian courts never do: review the solely religious decision of a church community. Until now, the courts have recoiled from getting involved in religious disputes—and for good reason.

Read more here.

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Barry W. Bussey, counsel for CCCC as intervener before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Vaughn Lee – Chairman and Elders James Scott Lang and Joe Gurney) and Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Randy Wall

Note:  The written legal brief “Factum” filed by CCCC in the court can be found here. For a video of the oral arguments at the hearing see:  The Supreme Court of Canada’s webcast. The following oral argument by Barry W. Bussey is found at minute 58 to 1:03.

Barry W. Bussey and Philip A.S. Milley represented CCCC at Supreme Court of Canada

Oral Argument

Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Randy Wall

Barry W. Bussey

November 2, 2017

May It Please the Court:

There are three points I would like to make today:

1. Religious membership is a private matter that does not engage a public interest;
2. The law is not equipped to review private religious matters;
3. This decision will impact my client’s membership.

Barry W. Bussey speaking on behalf of CCCC at the Supreme Court of Canada

1. Religious membership is a private matter that does not engage a public interest

My client submits that the law is not required, nor should it be burdened with the complexities of internal religious disputes.  Justice does not require law to extend to private intricate concern of theological controversy.  The law does not extend to every nook and cranny of private religious enterprise.

Having chosen to be a member of a voluntary religious community the individual chose to live in accordance with the norms of that community and to live with the realization that that community is the ultimate arbiter of their continued fitness for membership.  The law ought to respect this individual’s free choice even though, upon the dissolution of the relationship, there may be hard feelings and a loss of camaraderie.

Western Civilization has learned through history’s anvil that religious disputations are best left to the adherents.  This very week we have commemorated 500 years since the nailing of Luther’s 95 Theses on Wittenberg’s church door.  We are all aware of the tumultuous history that followed as the various heads of state took sides on what was, in essence, a theological dispute.  We have learned from our history that it is the best course of action for the state to leave internal religious disputes alone.

Individually we may sympathize and have compassion with how a religious member’s membership has been treated by his religious community, but our law has no place for such sympathy.  Not that the law is harsh or cruel but that the law is just in its realization that a person is free to join or not to join; that a religious community and its norms of membership, rooted as they are in theology and religious history, is to be respected.

2. The Law is not equipped to adequately review private religious matters.

The law has wisely recognized that it is not equipped to engage in theological disputes.   Secular law has no privity to the theological and socially contextual complexity of the religious community under review.  Our law has no understanding of such matters.  Nor, I would suggest, should it.

Consider, what might be the result of the law taking on religious disputes.  A religious community may argue about the nature of God – whether there is a Trinity.  Should the law hear a case about the lack of procedural fairness from those who lost the debate about the Trinity?

Debates about metaphysical truth within the context of religion are common.  In fact, it might be appropriate to say differences of opinion in religious matters are the norm.  Over the centuries religious communities in the West have shown themselves quite adept at handling religious disputes.  Unbridgeable differences have resulted in disgruntled members leaving and forming other religious communities. That, I suggest is the mark of a free society – free to enter; free to exit.

3. The Effect on our Members

Should religious communities have to be concerned about providing procedural fairness, as secularly understood, it will be an imposition on the religious beliefs and practices.  There are currently some 33000 religious charities in Canada.  Much of the work carried out by charities is done by volunteers.  This works because these people are religiously motivated.

In our experience, with our 3400 members we find that government regulations such as filing the annual CRA return the T3010 is a serious challenge for many.  They are religiously motivated to carry out the good work of the charity but are not motivated to carry out government requirements.

Imposing secular norms of procedural fairness on religious decisions will only take the volunteers from their good works.  First, they may not understand the legal nuance and properly carry out the secular norms.  Second, they will be hamstrung by disgruntled members who may have an “axe” to grind in a religious dispute. Third, they have limited resources to deal with court actions – their community, indeed our country, needs those resources and energy spent in ministry, not fighting over procedure.

Barry W. Bussey (CCCC counsel); Michael A. Feder (counsel for Mr. Wall)

David Gnam, (counsel for Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses); Barry W. Bussey (counsel for CCCC)

The post CCCC Makes Oral Argument At Wall Case appeared first on CCCC Blogs.

Credit: Barry W. Bussey

The Supreme Court of Canada has allowed 11 groups (some of which will appear jointly, making 9 applications) to intervene in the “Wall case.”[1] This case will be heard in Ottawa on November 2. It has attracted a lot of attention among religious communities because it deals with the rights and consequences of removing members who have violated the teachings and practices of the faith group.

Facts of the Case

Mr. Randy Wall was a member of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Alberta, Canada. He was dismissed by the Congregation because of his failure to live up to its teachings. Given that the community shuns those who leave the faith and the fact that, as a real estate agent, Mr. Wall lost his JW clients, the result was a financial loss.

He applied to court for a judicial review of the church’s decision with the intent of seeking compensation for his alleged mistreatment by the church. Justice Wilson of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta ruled that the Court had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Wall’s application for judicial review. The church lost its appeal at the Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) and has now appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Credit: Barry W. Bussey

Concerns

The ABCA decision raised serious questions about the extent to which civil courts can interfere in the decisions of religious communities. Traditionally, courts have been loath to get involved in church disputes. The thinking has been that courts have no expertise in the theological matters related to church discipline. It is generally understood that a law court is incompetent to deal with religious disputes.

The ABCA’s view that a church could be sued for the economic loss a member incurs because of expulsion is new legal ground and, if upheld by the SCC, it will endanger religious freedom.

Membership in a religious community is voluntary. No one is forced to stay. If a person limits his business to only those within a religious community and subsequently finds that none of his former co-congregants will do business with him, that is not the congregation’s responsibility. He took that risk himself when he so limited his business.

Membership in a religious community is a privilege, not a right. Allowing courts the jurisdiction to hear these cases will entangle courts unnecessarily in the internal affairs of religion.

Issues Raised by Canadian Council of Christian Charities

The CCCC will be making two broad points at the Supreme Court in the Wall Case:

Public vs. Private

Private bodies are not and should not be subject to the norms and obligations of public ​state ​bodies​, simply because those private bodies are granted regulatory recognition, such as charitable registration. The blurring ​of the lines ​between public and private bodies ​will result in the wrongful imposition of public obligations on private bodies.

Churches, for example, consist of a specifically defined congregation that has come together voluntarily for a specific purpose involving religious belief and practice. No public authority is tasked with religious teaching or ensuring that congregants follow appropriate religious norms. The freedom of citizens to associate in private organizations is a hallmark of a free and democratic society. Public recognition of a private organization that exists for the public benefit does not make it public.

Competence

Civil courts lack the competence to adjudicate religious matters. Civil courts should, therefore, refrain from assessing and adjudicating religious decisions and disputes, processes, and standards informed by or regarding inter alia, theology, liturgy, ecclesiology, ​​hamartiology, and hermeneutics which are outside of their expertise. Competence sufficient to decide religious matters, such as membership, requires a comprehensive understanding of, in addition to the topics already listed, the history and social realities of the religious community at issue.

Interference with religious matters unduly encroaches upon a religious community’s ability to carry out its theological, spiritual, and, in many cases, charitable endeavours.  Civil courts should, therefore, ​exercise​ restraint in matters ​in which they lack skill, training, and experience. Courts should respect a religious community’s ability to decide for itself matters of a spiritual and religious nature.

The interveners have been given 5 minutes to make their oral argument on November 2 and the right to file a legal brief outlining their arguments.

[1] Wall Case: Wall v. Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses

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The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decided today to hear the Wall case from Alberta.  The SCC must decide if a court has jurisdiction to hear a case of a former church member who is suing for damages because he lost his membership due to church discipline.  Here is a short synopsis of the case:

Wall v. Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2016 ABCA 255 (37273)

Mr. Wall was a member of the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, an unincorporated religious association. He was disfellowshipped by a Judicial Committee of elders because he was not sufficiently repentant for two incidents of drunkenness, one of which included verbal abuse of his wife, and was shunned. He was a real estate agent and lost congregation members and other Jehovah’s Witnesses as clients. He appealed to an Appeal Committee which upheld the disfellowship decision. The Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society of Canada decided not to overturn the decision. Mr. Wall applied for judicial review of the religious decision. Wilson J. conducted a hearing to determine whether the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta had jurisdiction to hear the application. Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta: declaration that Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta has jurisdiction to hear application for judicial review of religious decision. C.A.: appeal dismissed. “The application for leave to appeal…is granted with costs in the cause.”

The Alberta Court of Appeal (ABCA) decision raises a number of questions that have to be resolved.  Generally speaking, courts have been loath to get involved in church disputes.  Courts have no expertise in dealing with theological matters that are often the underlying cause of why members of a church are asked (or told) to leave. Imagine a court discussing topics like the proper understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the process of salvation. Such matters were not part of the law school curriculum. The point is a court is incompetent in dealing with religious disputes.

The majority of the ABCA decided that the courts have jurisdiction over procedural matters. In law we call it issues of “natural justice.” That is to say, the law protects people in organizations to the extent that the organization’s own internal rules of procedure were properly followed. There is a reasonable argument to be made for that position. However, a church is not a public body that should be subject to judicial review.

Further, the ABCA was of the view that a church could be sued for economic loss of a member being expelled. This is new ground for Canadian law – new ground for any law of a western democracy.  Membership in a religious community is voluntary. No one is forced to stay. If a person is no longer willing to abide by the teachings then they are free to go and make their way elsewhere. If that person limited his business to only those within the church community and subsequently finds that none of his former religionists will do business with him that is not the congregation’s responsibility.  He took that risk himself when he so limited his business.

Religious communities have been immune from litigation of former members who were asked to leave. Membership in a religious community is privilege not a right. Allowing courts jurisdiction to hear judicial review applications of such matters is to entangle the court unnecessarily in the internal affairs of religion. If a court is granted the right to hear such a review it is then able to grant orders of relief against the religious community for making religious decisions about membership. The law has no business there.

It is a good thing that the SCC decided to hear the case. Obviously, our highest Court understands the intricate issues that are in play in this case.

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It is an old adage: bad facts make bad law. Last week the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that a former member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW) had the right to sue his former church because they “shunned” or disfellowshipped him. Randy Wall, a real estate agent, had been a member of the JW faith for 34 years. In March 2014 he appeared before the church’s “Judicial Committee” because of his alleged incidents of drunkenness. During the hearing he admitted to being drunk on two occasions. However, he explained that his drinking on one occasion was the result of his despondency over the expulsion, from the congregation, of his 15 year old daughter and the church’s insistence that he and his wife were to “shun” their daughter for her offences against the faith. This put the family in distress. However, the Judicial Committee decided that he was not repentant and he too was disfellowshipped.

Wall appealed to the church’s Appeal Committee but was rejected, as was his further appeal to the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society of Canada.  In the fallout of his departure Wall lost half of his business clientele because they were JWs and would no longer do business with him.

Wall then took his former congregation to court on two grounds. First, he claimed to have been denied “natural justice”. Natural justice requires that a decision-maker provide the person appearing before him or her basic procedural justice such as advanced notice of the hearing and its issues to be decided and an unbiased decision maker. Second, Wall wanted compensation for his economic loss that resulted from the church’s decision to disfellowship him.

In court, the church argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since it concerned internal church discipline matters. Historically, in liberal democratic states, the courts have been very reluctant to get involved in church disputes. Canadian courts have followed this well-worn path. The most common example of a court getting involved in an internal church dispute involves church dismissal of a clergy member where there is an employee/employer relationship.

The only case that comes close to this one, in my recollection, is the 1874 decision of the Privy Council (in London) which involved a dispute between the family of the deceased Joseph Guibord and the Catholic Church in Montreal over where Guibord was to be buried. The family wanted him buried in the consecrated area of the Catholic cemetery but the Church took the position that Guibord had so violated the instructions of the Bishop while he was alive that he had to be buried in the non-consecrated area of the cemetery. The Privy Council ruled that Guibord was to be buried in the consecrated area. After much acrimony that is where he was eventually buried — against the wishes of the church. After his burial the Church deconsecrated his burial plot, which only showed the futility of the court’s decision.

I cannot but wonder if the sympathetic facts in the Wall case had a part to play as to why the Alberta Court of Appeal took the decision it did. Consider that the JW church disfellowshipped Mr. Wall’s 15 year old daughter. Indeed, many who are not members of the church looking on might consider that objectionable. But the facts of the case also state that the church expected Mr. Wall and his wife to have very limited contact with their daughter because of her infraction, even to the point of suggesting or encouraging the family to have the child leave home. That did, no doubt, raise incredible pressure on Mr. Wall’s family. So much pressure, according to Mr. Wall, that it led him to drink alcohol to excess. That, in turn, was the basis of his own expulsion from church membership which then led to his business loss because the church members shunned him. It is a tragedy of events.

Given those facts, perhaps it is not surprising that he received a sympathetic hearing at the Court of Queen’s Bench and then at the Court of Appeal. However, bad facts make bad law. Because there are sympathetic facts, it does not give license for court intervention in internal church matters.

It is unheard of, in my experience and to my knowledge, that a court would say it has jurisdiction to hear a claim for compensation arising from a church expulsion. That has simply never been done.

The Alberta Court of Appeal’s 2-1 decision allows a trial court to hear Mr. Wall’s case. If Wall successfully proves his case it will be the first known Canadian case holding a church liable for financial loss of a church members’ expulsion. There is still some water to go under the bridge before this is a reality since the Court of Appeal decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Whatever the outcome, this case raises some very intriguing, and I would suggest, troubling implications going forward. If a court has jurisdiction to review a religious community’s decision to expel a member and to make that community potentially liable for any economic harm then I perceive the following: first, it goes against a very basic understanding of how liberal democracies operate: the separation of church and state. The state has no business telling a church what it can and cannot do. Of course, there has always been reasonable limits to this basic principle such as dealing with tax exempt regulations. We have, until now, intuitively recognized that when it comes to membership issues these are the domain of the church not the state. The church is not, as Justice Wakeling correctly observed in his dissenting opinion, a public actor.

It should be noted that Justice Wakeling’s decision is, in my view, by far more compelling than that of the majority decision. He has backed up his reasons with 110 detailed and thoughtful footnotes (verses zero footnotes by the majority) arguing that the Court’s majority decision has no legal precedent to review the church’s decision on Mr. Wall’s membership. Justice Wakeling has a deep understanding of the issues involved and I expect that if this case were to be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada his decision will be most persuasive.

The Court’s decision violates the separation of church and state principle because churches lose their autonomy to determine who can and cannot be a member. To suggest that the Court, by awarding damages, is helping to alleviate the sense of alienation, harm to dignity or financial loss because former friends do not want to associate with the person, as a result of a church membership decision, is an attempt to influence future decisions of religious bodies by threatening them with financial consequences for their religious decisions.

Second, consider the abuses that will become possible. A disgruntled member could hold the religious community at ransom – “Give me what I want or else…I am going to sue you for my losses in the breakdown of our relationship.” The demands could cover any kind of request including a demand of a church to change its teachings on a subject that is not deemed appropriate by the individual. And, if such teaching is politically incorrect then the church faces the strong arm of the state by sympathetic courts.

Third, under this new regime where are the boundaries for the courts? For example, will expulsion from other private organizations, such as the Rotary club or a local book club, warrant court intervention? As Justice Wakeling noted, Mr. Wall has no right to belong to the congregation nor does his freedom of association interest compel his former church members to associate with him.  We all recognize that our friendships will bring benefits – that is how community works. Anyone who has ever had to suffer the loss of a friendship understands that there are consequences including the loss of a larger community which may have financial implications.

But the courts are not there for us to cajole others into a relationship with us individually. Wakeling notes that “[m]ost people chose to act with others to better achieve their religious goals. They identify common values the presence of which makes a person a valuable group member.” To ensure that religious values are not curtailed by state actions, religious bodies must have the ability to select their members and religious leaders because, noted the Justice, the welfare of the religious association depends upon that ability.

Fourth, courts need to stick to their own area of expertise – the law. They do not have any ability to decipher the unique challenges and nuances faced by the religious community that made the decisions concerning membership. In order for the court to be competent to decide the issue of church membership it must fully understand the history, theology, and social realities of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith community. To decide otherwise the judge would be imposing his or her own particular bias on the community’s decision. Thus, given the multitude of religious communities in Canada the historical hesitance for a court to become entangled in religious disputes holds much wisdom. Rejecting such societal wisdom is fraught with danger.

The place of religion

This case further causes us to be concerned about the place of religion in Canadian society. The secular influence of our elites is pervasive. Religion is continually seen as something that is foreign. In many ways it is. The secular mind has a real difficulty in trying to understand the religious prohibitions on various lifestyle choices and ways of living. Consider for example, the September 12, 2016 trip of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to an Ottawa Muslim mosque. The media suggested that Trudeau’s presence in the mosque, where the men were on the floor in the large auditorium but the women were relegated to the balcony, showed Trudeau’s hypocrisy in light of his claim to be an ardent feminist.

However, Trudeau expressed the view that Canada’s strength lies in the fact that there is a huge diversity of communities that are to be respected. “This is an opportunity for us to come together to reflect on what makes Canada extraordinary as a country,” Trudeau explained. “We are a place that has figured out that diversity can be a source of strength not just a source of weakness. And as I look at this beautiful room with the sisters upstairs, everyone here – the diversity that we have just within this mosque, within the Islamic community, within the Muslim community in Canada, the diversity across our country, as we all know can and must be an opportunity for us to grow and to challenge ourselves to improve and create a stronger more peaceful society.”

“But the Canada we live in today didn’t happen by accident and it won’t continue without effort,” Trudeau insisted. It is only as we pull together, listen to each other, respect each other are we able to “build the kind of world that we all dream of.”

Religious communities have maintained peculiar practices and beliefs for thousands of years. Our modern secularity may consider them obsolete, anachronistic, politically incorrect, misogynist, or just plain wrong. However, the freedoms we enjoy today came, in no small part, because of the struggles over religious freedom. That heritage has given us a great legacy — one which recognized that diversity is not a weakness but a strength. That fundamental freedom has long required the courts not to interfere with the religious decisions of who can and cannot be a member of the religious community.

The Alberta Court of Appeal has willingly stepped into a quagmire with its September 8 decision. We are witnessing, yet again, that we have to relearn the wisdom of our forebearers that there are certain roads we ought not to tread. Court interference in religious communities is one of them.

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